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We give here the details of an application of the ANP to National Missile Defense 
(NMD), a $60 billion decision (one of the costliest undertaking ever) by the United 
States to deploy an anti-nuclear-missile missile defense system. This study I did in 
September 2000 developed with its strategic criteria, and benefits, opportunities, 
costs and risks.  Deploy NMD is the highest priority outcome, that is validated by 
sensitivity analysis. It was presented to the National Defense University in Washing-
ton in February 2002. In mid-December 2002 the US Government announced that it 
planned to develop the NMD — at best an interesting coincidence. Another exam-
ple, done in September-October 2002, was about the strategy that the US should fol-
low to remove the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq.  Going with the UN was the best 
outcome followed by a going alone or with a coalition. 
1. INTRODUCTION — THE NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE (NMD) 
Having given the steps of the Analytic Network Process (ANP) in Part 2.2, we 
will dedicate Part 2.3 to full blown examples of applications of the ANP. 
Not long ago, the United States government faced the crucial decision of 
whether or not to commit itself to the deployment of a National Missile Defense 
(NMD) system. Many experts in politics, the military, and academia had ex-
pressed different views regarding this decision. The most important rationale be-
hind supporters of the NMD system was protecting the U.S. from potential threats 
said to come from countries such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq. According to the 
Central Intelligence Agency, North Korea’s Taepo Dong long-range missile tests 
were successful, and it has been developing a second generation capable of reach-
ing the U.S. Iran also tested its medium-range missile Shahab-3 in July 2000. Op-
ponents expressed doubts about the technical feasibility, high costs (estimated at $60 
billion), political damage, possible arms race, and the exacerbation of foreign relations. 
The idea for the deployment of a ballistic missile defense system has been 
around since the late 1960s but the current plan for NMD originated with Presi-
dent Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in the 1980s. SDI investigated 
technologies for destroying incoming missiles. The controversies surrounding the 
project were intensified with the National Missile Defense Act of 1996, intro-
duced by Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) in June 25, 1996. The bill required Congress 
to make a decision on whether the U.S. should deploy the NMD system by 2000. 
The bill also targeted the end of 2003 as the time for the U.S. to be capable of de-
ploying NMD. The idea explored in this project is to develop and illustrate the 
three phases with a timely example, the intricate and very costly decision regard-
ing a National Missile Defense (NMD) system. Because of the possibility of de-
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pendence and feedback, we use the Analytic Network Process (ANP) and its 
software Super-Decisions with its sensitivity analysis option to examine the NMD 
decision. On February 21, 2002 this author gave a half-day presentation on the 
subject to National Defense University in Washington. In December 2002, Presi-
dent George W. Bush and his advisors decided to build the NMD. This study may 
have had no influence on the decision but still two years earlier (September 2000) 
it had arrived at the same outcome. The alternatives we considered for this analy-
sis are: Deploy NMD, Global defense, R&D, Termination of the NMD program. 
2. CRITERIA AND DECISION NETWORKS 
The second column of Tabl. 1 shows the criteria of each BOCR. For example, 
there are four benefits criteria: Economic (0.157), Political (0.074), Security 
(0.481) and Technology (0.288). The priorities attached to each are obtained 
through pairwise comparisons. Each criterion under benefits has subcriteria such 
as Local Economy and Defense Industry under Economic. Again, the priorities of 
the two subcriteria are obtained from pairwise comparisons and similarly for the 
remaining criteria and subcriteria under opportunities, costs and risks. Opportuni-
ties and risks have no subcriteria. The total number of criteria and subcriteria used 
as control criteria for the comparisons made in the networks is 23. The global pri-
orities of these criteria (subcriteria) shown in the last column of Tabl. 1 are ob-
tained by weighting their priorities by those of their parent criterion if there is 
one. For example, for local economy we have 022.0141.0157.0 =× . We will see 
later, after the BOCR merits are weighted, that the priorities of nine of these 
(shown in boldface), Military Capability, Technological Advancement, Arms 
Sales, Spin-Off, Security Threat, Sunk Cost, Further Investment, Arms Race, and 
Technical Failure account for approximately 0.760 of the total. To economize ef-
fort, we used these nine as control criteria each with its decision network to do the 
analysis. Actually we simply chose the top ones under each merit without being fully 
consistent about the cutoff point. For example we left out U.S. Reputation under 
Risks. All economic cost factors were included. We proceeded as if these nine 
criteria and subcriteria, called covering criteria for the alternatives, were the only 
criteria to drive the outcome. Their decision networks and connections are shown in 
Fig. 1–9. A more thorough analysis might include a few more criteria or subcriteria. 
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T a b l e  1 . Criteria and Their Priorities 
Merits Criteria Sub-criteria Global Priorities (Normalized) 
Local Economy (0.141) 0.022 Economic 
(0.157) Defense Industry (0.859) 0.135 
Bargaining Power (0.859) 0.064 Political 
(0.074) U.S. Military Leadership (0.141) 0.010 
Deterrence (0.267) 0.128 
Military Capability (0.590) 0.284 
Security 
(0.481) 
Antiterrorism (0.143) 0.069 
Tech. Advancement (0.834) 0.240 
Benefits 
Technology 
(0.288) Tech. Leadership (0.166) 0.048 
                         Arms Sales (0.520) 0.520 
                         Spin- off (0.326) 0.326 
                         Space Development (0.051) 0.051 
Opportunities 
                         Protection of Allies (0.103) 0.103 
Security Threat: Vulnerability to the security threat 0.687 
Sunk Cost (0.539) 0.123 Economic  
(0.228) Further Investment (0.461) 0.105 
ABM Treaty (0.589) 0.050 
Costs  
Political 
(0.085) Foreign Relations (0.411) 0.035 
                         Technical Failure (0.430) 0.430 
                         Arms Race (0.268) 0.268 
                         Increased Terrorism (0.052) 0.052 
                         Environmental Damage (0.080) 0.080 
Risks 
                         U.S. Reputation (0.170) 0.170 
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Fig. 2. Decision Network under The Technological Advancement. 
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Fig. 7. Decision Network under The Further Investment. 
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Fig. 6. Decision Network under the Sunk Cost. 
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3. FULL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ANALYSIS WITH RESPECT TO A SINGLE 
CRITERION 
We explain in outline form our thinking about the network under one of the crite-
ria. We have chosen Military Capability, one of the main control subcriteria, to 
elaborate the details of its decision network. There are five main parties involved 
in the decision making process of NMD: Congress, President/Military, Foreign 
Countries, Technical Experts and the Defense Industry. The latter two influence 
Congress and President/Military by providing their professional expertise and 
technical information. Allies among Foreign Countries can have a partial influ-
ence on Global Defense among the four alternatives through economic and tech-
nological cooperation. 
The first block of four rows and four columns in Tabl. 2, a, The Unweighted 
Supermatrix, indicates that Deploy NMD (NMD) and R&D (R&D) are influenced 
by Global Defense (Glob~) with priorities of 0.5760 and 0.4240 respectively. The 
next five columns and first four rows of Tabl. 3, a. The Unweighted Supermatrix, 
summarize the different views of actors on the contribution of each of the four 
alternatives to U.S. military capability. Congress, President/Military, Defense In-
dustry, and Technical Experts all have a say as to what extent the decision con-
tributes to the Military Capability of the U.S. All domestic actors think that De-
ploy NMD will increase military capability followed by Global Defense, R&D 
and Termination (Term~) but to different degrees. Deploy NMD (0.5587) was 
given the highest priority by Defense Industry, followed by the priority given by 
President/Military (0.5158), and Congress (0.5060). The lowest priority given to 
NMD is by Technical Experts (0.2878). It reflects the opinion of scientists who 
think Deploy NMD is technically infeasible and would not contribute to the en-
hancement of U.S. military capability. Only Global Defense is influenced by Al-
lies and thus the priority of Global Defense is equal to 1.0000. 
The fifth to the last row of Tabl. 2,a show connections among components 
(clusters) each consisting of a single element except for the component of Alter-
natives that has four elements. The priorities of the entries in these rows must be 
either 1.0000 or 0.0000 depending on whether there is influence among them. For 
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example, the fifth to the ninth entries of column one have unit entries obtained 
from answering the question “Is the component of Congress influenced by Deploy 
NMD?,” “Is the component of Defense Industry influenced by Deploy NMD?” 
and similarly for the other three alternatives. All actors are influenced by the three 
alternatives of Deploy NMD, Global Defense and R&D. Note that an entire col-
umn under Termination in the Unweighted Supermatrix of Tabl. 2,a consists of 
zeros because nothing is influenced by Termination and that leads to dropping the 
entire matter of missile defense. It is worth noting that under the Security Threat 
criterion of Costs (not shown here), the column under Termination in the Un-
weighted Supermatrix consists of non-zero values because security threat to the 
U.S. would continue particularly if Termination is chosen as it accentuates vul-
nerability of U.S. security.  
Tabl. 2,b shows the pairwise comparisons of the components. The judgments 
were obtained by answering the question “Which of two components is influ-
enced more by a third component with respect to military capability?” The eigen-
vectors of the pairwise comparisons of the components in the matrices of 
Tabl. 2,b are exhibited in Tabl. 2,c, augmented by zeros in those positions where 
the components on the left are not influenced by the component on top of the col-
umn. The Weighted Supermatrix of Tabl. 2,d illustrates the weighting of the 
blocks of the supermatrix by the priorities from the corresponding eigenvector of 
comparisons of the components in Tabl. 2,c. Tabl. 2,e, The Limit Supermatrix, 
yields the stable priorities of all the elements. From it, the priorities of the four 
alternatives are extracted and normalized. We obtain for (Deploy NMD, Global 
Defense, R&D, and Termination) the corresponding values (0.1532, 0.0968, 
0.0438, 0.0201) which when normalized by dividing by their sum yields the prior-
ity vector (0.488, 0.308, 0.140, and 0.064). This vector is included on the right of 
the first row of Tabl. 3,4. Similar computations are done for the remaining eight 
high priority criteria and their normalized results are included in Tabl. 3. An entry 
in each subcolumn of the supermatrix indicates the relative priority within the 
block to which that subcolumn belongs that an element on the left is influence by 
the element on top of the column with respect to Military Capability. Each sub-
column is an eigenvector imported from a corresponding pairwise comparisons 
matrix not shown here because its elements can be approximately formed from 
the ratios of the corresponding priority vector. A subcolumn of zeros indicates no 
influence and therefore no comparisons matrix is needed. 
T a b l e  2 .  All Matrices for the Military Capability Decision Network of Benefits 
T a b l e  2 , a .  The Unweighted Supermatrix 
MilCap  Altern~ Cong~ Def. Ind~ For~ Pre/Mil~ Tech~ 
Unweighted NMD Glob~ R & D Term~ Cong~ Industry Allies Military Tech~ 
Altern~ NMD 0.0000 0.5760 0.0000 0.0000 0.5060 0.5587 0.0000 0.5158 0.2878 
 Glob~ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2890 0.2574 1.0000 0.2929 0.2623 
 R & D 0.0000 0.4240 0.0000 0.0000 0.1307 0.1382 0.0000 0.1367 0.2369 
 Term~ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0744 0.0457 0.0000 0.0546 0.2130 
Cong~ Cong~ 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Defense Ind~ Industry 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
For~ Allies 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
Pre/Mil~ Military 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Tech~ Tech~ 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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T a b l e  2 , b . Pairwise Comparisons Matrices and Priorities of Components 
Pairwise comparing components with respect to the Alternatives component 
Q: Which of a pair of components is influenced more by the Alternatives component  
with respect to Military Capability? 
 Altern~ Cong~ Def. Ind~ For~ Pres~ Tech~ Prior. 
Altern~ 1.0000 0.1667 0.2500 1.3300 0.1429 0.5556 0.0486 
Cong~ 5.9999 1.0000 2.2000 6.2000 0.7407 3.2000 0.2889 
Def. Ind~ 4.0000 0.4546 1.0000 4.0000 0.4115 2.2600 0.1653 
For~ 0.7519 0.1613 0.2500 1.0000 0.1250 0.5263 0.0425 
Pres~ 7.0000 1.3500 2.4300 8.0000 1.0000 5.1000 0.3742 
Tech~ 1.8000 0.3125 0.4425 1.9000 0.1961 1.0000 0.0805 
 
Pairwise comparing components with respect to 
the Congress component 
Pairwise comparing components with respect 
to the Defense Industry component 
Q: Which of a pair of components is influenced 
more by the Congress component with respect 
to Military Capability? 
Q: Which of a pair of components is influ-
enced more by the Defense Industry compo-
nent with respect to Military Capability? 
  Altern~ Pres~  Prior.    Altern~ Cong~  Pres~ Prior. 
Altern~ 1.0000 0.5638 0.3605  Altern~ 1.0000 0.6769 0.5388 0.2292 
Pres~   1.7736 1.0000 0.6395  Congr~  1.4773 1.0000 0.6600 0.3181 
     Pres~ 1.8561 1.5152 1.0000 0.4528 
 
Pairwise comparing components with respect 
to the Foreign Countries component  
Pairwise comparing components with respect 
to the Presidnet/Military component 
Q: Which of a pair of components is influ-
enced more by the Foreign Countries com-
ponent with respect to Military Capability? 
 
Q: Which of a pair of components is influ-
enced more by the President / Military com-
ponent with respect to Military Capability? 
  Altern~ Cong~ Pres~ Prior.    Altern~ Cong~ For~ Prior. 
Altern~ 1.0000 0.5556 0.3259 0.1671  Altern~ 1.0000 2.1887 3.6604 0.5735 
Cong~ 1.8000 1.0000 0.4632 0.2781  Congr~ 0.4569 1.0000 2.0377 0.2799 
Pres~ 3.0682 2.1591 1.0000 0.5548  For~ 0.2732 0.4907 1.0000 0.1467 
 
Pairwise comparing components with respect  
to the Technical Experts component 
Q: Which of a pair of components is influenced more by the Technical Ex-
perts component with respect to Military Capability? 
 Altern~ Cong~ Pres~ Prior. 
Altern~ 1.0000 2.5379 2.5379 0.5593 
Congr~ 0.3940 1.0000 1.0000 0.2204 
Pres~ 0.3940 1.0000 1.0000 0.2204 
   
T a b l e  2 , c . Priorities Matrix of Eigenvectors 
How much components are influenced by each component; imported  
from the matrices of Tabl. 3b above 
Clusters Altern~ Cong~ Def. Ind~ For~ Pres~ Tech~ 
Altern~ 0.0486 0.3605 0.2292 0.1671 0.5735 0.5593 
Cong~ 0.2889 0.0000 0.3181 0.2781 0.2799 0.2204 
Def. Ind~ 0.1653 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
For~ 0.0425 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1467 0.0000 
Pres~ 0.3742 0.6395 0.4528 0.5548 0.0000 0.2204 
Tech~ 0.0805 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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T a b l e  2 , d .  The Weighted Supermatrix 
Priorities from Tabl. 3c are used to weight corresponding blocks  
of unweighted supermatrix of Tabl. 3,a 
MilCap  Altern~ Cong~ Def. Ind~ For~ Pre/Mil~ Tech~ 
Weighted  NMD Glob~ R & D Term~ Cong~ Industry Allies Military Tech~ 
Altern~ NMD 0.0000 0.0280 0.0000 0.0000 0.1824 0.1280 0.0000 0.2958 0.1610 
 Glob~ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1042 0.0590 0.1671 0.1680 0.1467 
 R & D 0.0000 0.0206 0.0000 0.0000 0.0471 0.0317 0.0000 0.0784 0.1325 
 Term~ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0268 0.0105 0.0000 0.0313 0.1191 
Cong~ Cong~ 0.3037 0.2889 0.3037 0.0000 0.0000 0.3181 0.2780 0.2799 0.2204 
Defense Ind~ Industry 0.1737 0.1653 0.1737 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
For~ Allies 0.0446 0.0425 0.0446 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1467 0.0000 
Pre/Mil~ Military 0.3933 0.3742 0.3933 0.0000 0.6395 0.4528 0.5548 0.0000 0.2204 
Tech~ Tech~ 0.0846 0.0805 0.0846 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
T a b l e  2 , e .  The Limit Supermatrix 
The weighted supermatrix raised to sufficiently large powers to stabilize  
within rounded off four place decimals 
MilCap  Altern~ Cong~ Def. Ind~ For~ Pre/Mil~ Tech~ 
Limited  NMD Glob~ R & D Term~ Cong~ Industry Allies Military Tech~ 
Altern~ NMD 0.1532 0.1532 0.1532 0.0000 0.1532 0.1532 0.1532 0.1532 0.1532 
 Glob~ 0.0968 0.0968 0.0968 0.0000 0.0968 0.0968 0.0968 0.0968 0.0968 
 R & D 0.0438 0.0438 0.0438 0.0000 0.0438 0.0438 0.0438 0.0438 0.0438 
 Term~ 0.0201 0.0201 0.0201 0.0000 0.0201 0.0201 0.0201 0.0201 0.0201 
Cong~ Cong~ 0.2224 0.2224 0.2224 0.0000 0.2224 0.2224 0.2224 0.2224 0.2224 
Defense Ind~ Industry 0.0513 0.0513 0.0513 0.0000 0.0513 0.0513 0.0513 0.0513 0.0513 
For~ Allies 0.0619 0.0619 0.0619 0.0000 0.0619 0.0619 0.0619 0.0619 0.0619 
Pre/Mil~ Military 0.3255 0.3255 0.3255 0.0000 0.3255 0.3255 0.3255 0.3255 0.3255 
Tech~ Tech~ 0.0250 0.0250 0.0250 0.0000 0.0250 0.0250 0.0250 0.0250 0.0250 
4. BOCR WEIGHT DEVELOPMENT 
The judgments used in this analysis were our interpretation of what experts 
thought about the various issues obtained from the vast reading of the literature 
we examined and from following the news closely for a period of more than six 
months. We also consulted some knowledgeable people on the subject in the area. 
We quickly realized there is no single expert in all the criteria we considered. 
Sensitivity analysis given later would essentially vary these judgments widely to 
determine the stability of the outcome. The assessment criteria used to determine 
the priorities of the BOCR merits are shown in Fig. 10. These are World Peace, 
Human Well-being, and International Politics. All these criteria have subcriteria 
under them. The three subcriteria, Adversary Countries, Security Dilemma and 
Terrorism cover all the causes disturbing or stabilizing peace in the world. The 
first subcriterion, Adversary Countries, concerns the potential threats by adver-
sary countries. The second criterion, Security Dilemma, means that increasing one 
country’s security inevitably decreases other countries’ security. Terrorism indi-
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cates any possibility of the rise or decline of terrorism in the world. Human Well-
being includes Technological Advancement and Market Creation. Technological 
Advancement driven by the NMD research and development process can ulti-
mately benefit all people, particularly in providing possible space exploration that 
can lead to the creation of new markets. Moreover, the 21st century is character-
ized as a post-industrialization era. Service industries in communication and 
transportation will benefit not only businesses associated with these industries, 
but also consumers who can enjoy the products from the new market. The last 
criterion is International Politics. It is composed of two subcriteria, Military Rela-
tions and Diplomatic Relations. Military Relations refer to the impact of NMD on 
relations with U.S. allies for better or for worse. Also, the impact of NMD on dip-
lomatic relations among all countries should be considered. The priorities shown 
next to the criteria and subcriteria in Fig. 10 were obtained through the usual 
pairwise comparison process of the AHP according to their importance with re-
spect to their higher-level goal or parent criterion. 
The four merits of BOCR were rated according to five intensities listed be-
low along with their priorities. The outcome is summarized in Tabl. 3. The inten-
sities were derived from pairwise comparisons. 
T a b l e  3 .  Priority Ratings for the Merits: Benefits, Opportunities, Costs and Risks 
Very High (0.419), High (0.263), Medium (0.160), Low (0.097), Very Low (0.061) 
  Benefits Opportunities Costs Risks 
Adversary Countries Very High Medium High Very Low 
Security Dilemma Very Low Very Low Very High Very Low World Peace 
Terrorism Medium Very Low High High 
Technological Ad-
vancement High High Low Very Low Human 
Well-Being Market Creation Medium High Very Low Very Low 
Military Relations High High Medium Very Low Interna-
tional Poli-
tics Diplomatic Relations Low Low Low Very High 
Priorities  0.264 0.185 0.361 0.190 
 
Note that BOCR are rated one at a time and are not obtained from paired 
comparisons. They are obtained using the rating approach of the AHP. 
As we said earlier if we weight the priorities derived in Tabl. 1 by the corre-
sponding priorities of the merits just derived and then add we get: 
EVALUATING MERITS
WORLD PEACE
Adversary Countries
Security Dilemma
Terrorism
HUMAN WELL-BEING
Technological Advancement
Market Creation
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
Military Relations
Diplomatic Relations
Fig. 10. Strategic Criteria for BOCR Ratings 
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 +×+×+×+×+× 687.0361.0326.0185.0520.0185.0240.0264.0284.0264.0  
 76.0268.0190.0430190.0105.0361.0123.0361.0 ≈×+×+×+×+ . 
In most of our studies we attempt to use factors whose total weight in not 
less than 70%. 
5. OVERALL OUTCOME  
Tabl. 4 shows the priorities of the nine control criteria or subcriteria, the corre-
sponding priorities of the alternatives that are normalized from Tabl. 2,e, The 
Limit Supermatrix, their synthesis for each of the BOCR merits together with the 
normalized reciprocals under costs and risks. The final outcome in Tabl. 5 is de-
rived by weighting the synthesized priorities of the alternatives of Tabl. 4 by the 
priorities of the BOCR merits, again using the reciprocals of the synthesized pri-
orities of the alternatives under costs and risks.  
T a b l e  4 .  Synthesized Priorities of the Nine Control Criteria and Subcriteria 
Merits Criteria Subcriteria Deploy NMD 
Global 
Defense R&D Termination 
Benefits 
(0.264) 
Security 
(0.481) 
Military Capa-
bility (0.590) 0.488 0.308 0.140 0.064 
 Technical (0.288)  
Technical Ad-
vancement 
(0.834) 
0.364 0.398 0.172 0.066 
Benefits Synthesized 0.226 0.183 0.081 0.034 
Benefits Normalized  0.431 0.349 0.155 0.065 
Arms Sales (0.520) 0.483 0.300 0.145 0.072 Opportunities
(0.185) Spin-Off (0.326) 0.506 0.264 0.146 0.084 
Opportunities Synthesized 0.416 0.242 0.123 0.065 
 Opportunities Normalized 0.492 0.286 0.145 0.077 
Costs 
(0.361) Security Threat (0.687) 0.087 0.164 0.275 0.475 
 Economic (0.228) 
Sunk Cost 
(0.539) 0.476 0.273 0.158 0.092 
  
Further In-
vestment 
(0.461) 
0.525 0.258 0.143 0.074 
Costs Synthesized 0.173 0.173 0.223 0.345 
Costs Normalized 0.189 0.189 0.244 0.377 
Costs Reciprocal 0.305 0.305 0.236 0.153 
Technical Failure (0.430) 0.473 0.269 0.154 0.103 Risks 
(0.190) Arms Race (0.268) 0.410 0.284 0.181 0.124 
Risks Synthesized 0.313 0.192 0.115 0.078 
Risks Normalized 0.448 0.275 0.165 0.112 
Risks Reciprocal 0.107 0.174 0.291 0.428 
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T a b l e  5 .  Overall Results 
Alternatives Benefits Opportuni-ties Costs Risks Overall 
 0.264 0.185 0.361 0.190  
Deploy NMD 0.431 0.492 0.305 0.107 0.335 
Global Defense 0.349 0.286 0.305 0.174 0.288 
R & D 0.155 0.145 0.236 0.291 0.208 
Termination 0.065 0.077 0.153 0.428 0.168 
 
Deploy NMD (0.335) scores the highest. It is a comprehensive result that 
takes into consideration all BOCR. The conclusion of this analysis is that pursu-
ing the deployment of NMD is the best alternative. This is because, as it is shown 
in Tabl. 5, Deploy NMD has the highest priorities for three (benefits, opportuni-
ties and costs) of the four merits. But we must now examine how realistic this 
outcome is. 
6. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
One might have different judgments in comparing the importance of BOCR or of 
the nine control criteria. To ensure the stability of the outcome of our analysis, we 
conducted sensitivity analysis.  
A. Sensitivity Analysis at the BOCR Level 
First, we increased and decreased one of the four merits of BOCR keeping the 
others proportionally the same. For example, if benefits were to be increased from 
its original priority 0.264 to 0.500, the sum of the other three merits would com-
prise the other 0.500 and the proportion among them would remain the same as 
before and their new priorities would be: opportunities, 0.124, costs, 0.246, and 
risks, 0.130. We found that no matter how much we increased or decreased the 
priorities of benefits, opportunities and costs the overall ranks of the final out-
come were preserved although these experiments changed the magnitude of the 
superiority of the best alternative, Deploy NMD (for example, from 0.301 to 
0.431 for benefits as Fig. 11 shows). Only changing the priority of risks reversed 
the ranks of the four alternatives. This occurred only when the priority of the risks 
were as large as 0.375 or more. Then, Termination gradually became third then 
second and finally the best alternative as the priority of risks was increased more 
and more (Figs 12). 
B. Sensitivity Analysis at the Control Criterion Level 
We did similar tests for the nine criteria that have decision networks. We found 
that the outcome was very stable and did not change the overall ranks except for 
changes of the three criteria: Security Threat, Sunk Cost and Further Investment 
all under costs. When the priority of Security Threat decreased to about 0.172 
from 0.687 (Fig. 13) or the priority of Sunk Cost increased to 0.753 (Fig. 14) or 
the priority of Further Investment increased to 0.734 (Fig. 15), Termination 
gradually began to move to third, second and finally to first rank position. 
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Some are highly concerned with risks associated with NMD, such as Tech-
nical Failure and Arms Race. We did another test using larger priorities for risks 
to see if it would change the outcome. In that case, the control criterion, U.S. 
Reputation, under risks replaced the control criterion, Further Investment, under 
costs. Interestingly enough, the ranks of the alternatives were the same as in 
Tabl. 5 with a slightly higher priority for Deploy NMD. 
Our sensitivity analysis indicates that the final ranks of the alternatives might 
change, but such change requires making extreme assumptions on the priorities of 
BOCR and of their corresponding control criteria. The outcome in Tabl. 5 is 
very stable and the United States should choose Deploy NMD as the best al-
ternative for the decision. 
I am grateful to my colleague Professor Dr. Klaus Dellmann for his careful 
reading and suggestions to improve the paper and to my student Yeonmin Cho for 
her untiring efforts in preparing the case study and above all Mujgan Ozdemir for 
helping me prepare this final version. 
 
Fig. 12. Sensitivity Analysis for Risks. Termination becomes the more preferred alterna-
tive as the priority of risks increases 
Fig. 11.  Sensitivity Analysis for Benefits. The rank remains the same regardless of the 
priorities of benefits 
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Fig. 13. Sensitivity Analysis for Security Threat: If the priority of Security Threat be-
comes less than about 0.172, Termination becomes the more preferred alternative 
Fig. 15. Sensitivity Analysis for Further Investment. If the priority of Further Investment 
becomes larger than 0.734, Termination becomes the more preferred alternative 
Fig. 14. Sensitivity Analysis for Sunk Cost. If the priority of Sunk Cost becomes larger 
than about 0.753, Termination becomes the more preferred alternative 
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7. US POLICY TOWARDS IRAQ 
For this example done jointly with my student Bethany Simunich in October 
2002, we give the Tabl. 6 and Figs 16–20 without as much discussion as in the 
previous example. This is a two level model with the decision subnets directly 
attached to the merits and with no control criteria. 
 
EVALUATING MERITS
ECONOMIC
Monetary Cost of War
Change in Oil Prices
Focus Shift away from U.S. Economy
MILITARY
WMD
U. S. Military casualties
Removal of Dictator
POLITICAL
Allied reaction
Arab world reaction
Regime change
SOCIAL
Iraqi civilians
Public Opinion
Fig. 16. Strategic Criteria for Rating the BOCR Merits 
Fig. 17. The Decision Subnet under Benefits 
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Рис. 19. The Decision Subnet under Opportunities 
Fig. 18. The Decision Subnet under Costs 
Fig. 20. The Decision Subnet under Risks 
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T a b l e .  6 .  Overall Outcome 
Alternatives Priorities 
Pre-emptive Attack on Iraq 0.17 
Attack Iraq only with Allied Help 0.27 
Work with UN to Ensure Weapons Inspections 0.37 
Remove Sanctions 0.19 
 
It appears at this writing, the war has just begun, that it would have been bet-
ter for USA to work with the U.N. although by combining the priorities of the 
first two alternatives, one may infer that the course followed in practice is also 
justified by this analysis. 
REFERENCES 
1. Saaty, Thomas L. The Analytic Network Process, RWS Publications, 4922, Ellsworth 
Avenue, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15213. 
2. Saaty, Thomas L. Theory Analytic Hierarchy and Analytic Network Processes-
Examples, Part 2.2. // System research and information technologies. — № 2. — 
2003. — P. 7–33. 
3. Simunich, B. An Evaluation of U.S. Foreign Policy re: Iraq Using the ANP, October 
2002, Unpublished Project. 
Received 03.09.2003 
 
From the Editorial Board: The article corresponds completely to submitted manuscript. 
